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Abstract
Using a longitudinal matched employer-employee data set for Portugal over the 1986-2005
period, this study analyzes the heterogeneity in wages responses to aggregate labor market
conditions for newly hired workers and existing workers. Accounting for both worker and ﬁrm
heterogeneity, the data support the hypothesis that entry wages are much more procyclical than
current wages. A one-point increase in the unemployment rate decreases wages of newly hired
male workers by around 2.8% and by just 1.4% for workers in continuing jobs. Since we estimate
the ﬁxed eﬀects, we were able to show that unobserved heterogeneity plays a non-trivial role in
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1the cyclicality of wages. In particular, worker ﬁxed eﬀects of new hires and separating workers
behave countercyclically, whereas ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects exhibit a procyclical pattern. Finally, the
results reveal, for all workers, a wage-productivity elasticity of 1.2, slightly above the one-for-
one response predicted by the Mortensen-Pissarides model.
JEL classiﬁcation: J31; E24; E32;
Keywords: wage cyclicality; hires; ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects; compositional eﬀects; labor produc-
tivity
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The cyclical behavior of real wages has been the subject of many studies since the debate of Keynes
(1939), Dunlop (1938), and Tarshis (1939). Earlier studies based on aggregate data showed some
ambiguous results. In this case, the best conclusion is that the choice of the time period analysis,
price deﬂator, and cyclical indicator, as well as the choice between wage rates and average earnings
(including overtime or not), may substantially aﬀect the estimates of real wage cyclicality [Abraham
and Haltiwanger (1995)]. One reason why these studies have reached no deﬁnitive conclusions
resides in the fact that they have been performed at the aggregate level. In particular, they
have ignored the changes in the composition of the workforce over the cycle. The presence of
compositional eﬀects has attracted much attention in the last years and recent micro-data studies
based on panel data for the U.S. showed that composition bias plays an important role on real wage
behavior along the business cycle [see, for example, Mitchell et al. (1985), Bils (1985), Keane et al.
(1988) and Solon et al. (1994)]. In fact, cyclical changes in the composition of the work force may
induce a countercyclical bias in the aggregate real wage. Aggregate measures of real wages tend
to give more weight to low-skill workers during expansions than during recessions. The argument
is that if less-skilled workers are more vulnerable to layoﬀ, they will account for a smaller share
of employment in recessions than in expansions. An additional general problem of aggregation is
that it assumes that the relationship between real wages and the business cycle is the same for
all individuals or groups of individuals. If wrong, the estimates of real wage cyclicality include a
speciﬁcation bias.
Over the last two decades, a number of studies based on micro-panel data for the U.S. (and
recently for Britain) point quite decisively toward a procyclical behavior of real wages.1 Panel
microdata also show that real wage changes of job movers are much more procyclical than real
wage changes of job stayers [see Solon et al. (1994), Shin (1994) and Devereux (2001) for the U.S.
and Devereux and Hart (2006) and Hart (2006) for Britain].
Several theoretical explanations have been advanced in order to explain why job changers have
more procyclical wages. The most frequent explanation relies on the existence of interindustry wage
diﬀerentials. This interpretation was ﬁrst advanced by Okun (1973), who argued that certain jobs
oﬀer rents to workers. If these sectors are also more cyclically sensitive, workers can switch into
1For insightful surveys see Brandolini (1995) and Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995).
3high-paying jobs during booms because such jobs are less tightly rationed during these times.
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) advanced a more convincing explanation for the diﬀerences in
wage cyclicality between job stayers and job changers, even though their explanation abstracts
from heterogeneity across jobs. According to their ﬁndings, current unemployment rate does not
aﬀect wages after controlling for the best labor market conditions since a worker was hired at
his/her current job. Indeed, when workers are not mobile between employers, current labor market
conditions do not aﬀect current wages. In this case, current wages are negatively correlated with
the unemployment rate at the time each worker was hired. However, if workers are very mobile,
wages are correlated with the best labor market conditions observed since the worker was hired.
Barlevy (2001) oﬀered a new explanation for the existence of more procyclical wages of job
changers: compensating diﬀerentials. In order to show that compensating diﬀerentials instead of
interindustry wage diﬀerentials generate a more procyclical behavior of wages of changers, Bar-
levy developed a model that relates unemployment insurance and wage cyclicality. His empirical
ﬁnding of a negative relationship between wage cyclicality among job changers and the level of
unemployment insurance beneﬁts, supports the view that job changers’ wages are more procyclical
because in booms they obtain jobs that pay a compensating diﬀerential for the risk of layoﬀ.I n
this case, workers who change jobs during booms may not realize true gains from the higher wages
they receive, since these gains are typically oﬀset during recessions.
Recent microeconometric evidence on wage cyclicality also gave a new insight to the discus-
sion about business cycle ﬂuctuations of unemployment and vacancies and wage stickiness. Indeed,
some authors argue that the Mortensen-Pissarides [Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000)] search and matching model cannot explain the cyclical volatility of unemployment and va-
cancies [Hall (2003) and Shimer (2005)]. Furthermore, they also show that if the hypothesis of rigid
wages is introduced, the model performs much better in matching ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and vacancies.
In a recent exercise, however, Pissarides (2007) showed that the wage stickiness hypothesis does
not seem to match the empirical data. Exploring the idea that in the search and matching model
j o bc r e a t i o ni sd r i v e nb yt h ed i ﬀerence between the expected productivity and the expected cost of
labor in new matches, Pissarides shows that in equilibrium the wages negotiated in new matches
are about as cyclical as productivity. This prediction of the model seems to be consistent with the
empirical evidence that wages in new matches are much more procyclical than wages in continuing
4jobs.
Haefke et al. (2007) also defend this point of view. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS)
they showed that wages of newly hired workers are much more volatile than aggregate wages and
respond one-to-one to changes in labor productivity.
In this context, the motivation to empirical research is to have appropriate data that allow
testing if wages in new matches are more volatile than those in continuing jobs. As mentioned
above, previous empirical studies have been showing that job changers’ wages are much more
procyclical than job stayers’ wages. However, and since these studies do not seem to fully control
for compositional eﬀects, it can always be argued that the empirical evidence merely reﬂects the
impact on wages of workers drifting from low wage ﬁrms to high wage ﬁrms in expansions, and
vice-versa during recessions.
This paper adds to the empirical literature on wage cyclicality in several ways. The main
contribution is the analysis of the impact of the cycle on real wage growth of new hires versus
stayers within the same ﬁrm. The key question to be answered is: are starting-wages, conditional
on the long-term wage policy of the ﬁrm, more sensitive to the economic cycle? To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that explicitly deals with this issue controlling simultaneously for
worker and ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity, which allows handling of both sources of composition
bias in wage cyclicality. In fact, beyond the possibility that average worker quality may change
over the cycle, for several reasons job quality may also exhibit a cyclical pattern. Some authors
have provided evidence that in recessions individuals take lower-paying jobs that dissolve more
quickly whereas in expansions ﬁrms create high-paying jobs that last longer (see, for example,
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and Bowlus (1995)). Furthermore, the industry composition may
also change over the cycle. This paper points out the importance of controlling for both worker
and ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity when analyzing the cyclical behavior of wages. Worker and ﬁrm
unobserved heterogeneity, both respond strongly to changes in unemployment rates.
For this purpose a unique and rich matched employer-employee longitudinal data set - Quadros
de Pessoal - will be used and a new iterative procedure that provides the exact OLS solution to the
two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model will be employed.
Two additional contributions of this paper deserve attention. The ﬁr s ti st ot e s ti ft h ei m p a c t
of the unemployment rate on wages really reﬂects labor-market tightness disentangling between
the job ﬁnding probability and the job separation probability. Finally, we analyze how the two
5components of observed wages - bargained wage and the wage cushion - evolve over the cycle.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the architecture of the Portuguese wage
setting system. In Section 3 the data set and methodology are described. The main results and
some robustness checks are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions are outlined in Section 5.
2 The Architecture of the Portuguese Wage Setting System
2.1 Collective Bargaining
The Portuguese Constitution provides the juridical principles of collective bargaining and grants
unions the right to negotiate. The eﬀects of the agreements are formally recognized and considered
valid sources of labor law.
Concerning the bargaining mechanisms, a distinction should be made between the conventional
regime and the mandatory regime. Conventional bargaining results from direct negotiation between
employers’ and workers’ representatives. A mandatory regime, on the other hand, does not result
from direct bargaining between workers and employers, being instead dictated by the Ministry of
Labor. The Ministry can extend an existing collective agreement to other workers initially not
covered by it or it can create a new one, if it is not viable to extend the application of an existing
document. A mandatory regime is applied when workers are not covered by unions, when one of
the parties involved refuses to negotiate, or bargaining is obstructed in any other way.2 Therefore,
the impact of collective bargaining goes far beyond union membership and the distinction between
union and non-union workers or ﬁrms becomes meaningless.
Usually collective negotiations are conducted at the industry or occupation level. Firm-level
negotiation, which for a time was a common practice in large public enterprises, has lost importance.
The law does not establish mechanisms of coordination between agreements reached in diﬀerent
negotiations; however preference is given to vertical over horizontal agreements, and the principle
of the most favorable condition to the worker generally applies.
Since most collective agreements are industry-wide, covering companies with very diﬀerent sizes
and economic conditions, their contents tend to be general, setting minimum working conditions,
2Beyond the existence of compulsive extension mechanisms, voluntary extensions are also possible, when one
economic partner (workers’ representative or employer) decides to subscribe to an agreement that it had initially not
signed.
6in particular the base monthly wage for each category of workers, overtime pay and the normal
duration of work. Moreover, only a narrow set of topics is updated annually, and therefore the
content of collective agreements is often pointed out as being too immobile and containing little
innovation.
Whatever the wage ﬂoor agreed upon for each category of workers at the collective bargaining
table, ﬁrms are free to pay higher wages, and they often deviate from that benchmark, adjusting
to ﬁrm-speciﬁc conditions [see Cardoso and Portugal (2005)].
The Portuguese system of industrial relations apparently presents features of a centralized wage
bargaining system. Indeed, massive collective agreements, often covering a whole industry, pre-
dominate in the economy, while ﬁrm-level collective bargaining covers a low proportion (less than
10 percent) of the workforce. Moreover, trade union confederations, employers’ federations and the
Government meet at the national level each year to set a guideline for wage increases (the so-called
“social concertation”). However, this guideline is not mandatory and merely guides the collective
bargaining that follows. The Council for Social Concertation, later replaced by the Social and
Economic Council, was created in 1984 as a tripartite forum (government, workers, and employers’
representatives) with the aim of promoting “social concertation”, but its role concerning income
and wage policies remains limited.
On the other side, the fragmented nature of the trade union structure, the fragmented employers’
associations and the multiplicity of bargaining units provides the system with a certain degree of
decentralization. Even though collective bargaining in Portugal takes place at a sectorial level and
most workers are covered by the bargaining system due to the existence of mandatory extensions,
the coordination between bargaining units is rather limited. In fact, the right to negotiate is given
to every employer or employers’ association and to every trade union (regardless of the number
of aﬃliated members they represent), and the parties have the possibility of choosing the level of
negotiation - regional, occupational, industrial, or national. This leads to the existence of a diﬀuse
and complex system of wage bargaining with negotiation fragmented and agreements multiplied.
2.1.1 Minimum Wages
A mandatory minimum monthly wage was set for the ﬁrst time in Portugal in 1974, covering workers
aged 20 or older and excluding agriculture and domestic servants. Currently, there is a single legal
minimum wage that applies to all workers. Workers formally classiﬁed as apprentices receive just
780 percent of the full rate.
The minimum wage is updated annually by the parliament, under government proposal.3 De-
cisions on the level of the minimum wage are taken on a discretionary basis, usually taking into
account past and predicted inﬂation and after consulting the social partners.
In 2005, the minimum monthly wage level was 374.7 €, representing 40 percent of the average
monthly wage in the private sector. In this same year the proportion of workers that received the
minimum legal wage was about 5 percent.4
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
3.1 Data Description
Data for this study come from a unique and rich matched employer-employee data set - Quadros
de Pessoal (QP). QP is a mandatory annual employment survey collected by the Portuguese Min-
istry of Labor and Social Solidarity, which covers virtually all establishments with wage earners.5
Indeed, each year every establishment with wage earners is legally obliged to ﬁll in a standardized
questionnaire. Requested data cover the establishment itself (location, industry, and employment),
the ﬁrm (location, industry, employment, sales, ownership, and legal setting) and each of its workers
(gender, age, education, skill, occupation, admission date, earnings, and duration of work). The
information on earnings is very complete. It includes the base wage (gross pay for normal hours
of work), regular beneﬁts, irregular beneﬁts, and overtime pay, as well as the mechanism of wage
bargaining. Information on normal and overtime hours of work is also available.
Eighteen spells of QP, from 1986 to 2005, were available for this study.6 From 1986 to 1993 the
information was collected in March of each year, and since 1994, in October.
There are three main reasons that make this survey a good source for the study of wage cyclical-
ity. The ﬁrst is its coverage. By law, the questionnaire is made available to every worker in a public
space of the establishment. This requirement facilitates the work of the services of the Ministry of
Labor that monitor compliance of ﬁrms with the law (e. g., illegal work). Indeed, the administra-
tive nature of the data and its public availability implies a high degree of coverage and reliability.
3The only exceptions are 1982, when it was not updated, and 1989, when it was updated twice.
4Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity (GEP) - Earnings Survey.
5Public administration and non-market services are excluded.
6Worker level ﬁles are not available for the years of 1990 and 2001.
8Currently, the data set collects data on about 350,000 ﬁrms and 3 million employees. Second, this
survey is conducted on a yearly basis, and its identifying scheme allows accurate identiﬁcation of
ﬁrms and workers, making it possible to track them over the years. Each ﬁrm entering the database
is assigned a unique identifying number and the Ministry implements several checks to ensure that
a ﬁrm that has already reported to the database is not assigned a diﬀerent identiﬁcation number.
Using this identiﬁer it is possible to pinpoint all ﬁrms that have entered and exited economic ac-
tivity. The workers’ identiﬁcation number is based on a transformation of his/her social security
number. We match the individuals over the years based on their identiﬁcation number, gender, year
and month of birth. Finally, this source enables the matching of ﬁrms and their workers, which
allows us to classify the situation of the worker on the job (stayer/mover, accession/separation).
Moreover, employer-reported wage information is known to be subject to less measurement error
than worker-reported data.
Our data set includes the population of full-time wage earners in the private non-farm sector,
aged between 20 and 55 years old.7 We have also excluded those individuals for whom an explana-
tory variable is not available for a particular year, namely those with no information on wages and
hours worked. In order to minimize the eﬀects of outliers in wages, we dropped 1 percent of the
observations corresponding to the top and bottom tails of the wage distribution.
In order to control for workers’ unobserved heterogeneity using a ﬁrst-diﬀerences approach,
most empirical studies on real wage cyclicality tend to restrict the sample to workers employed for
two consecutive years. In this study this restriction is avoided in order to be able to include in
the analysis those individuals with a weak labor force/employment attachment. Thus, our data
set includes the individuals that are present in two consecutive years,8 but also contains those
individuals that are present in the QP registers in year t but are absent in year t +1(hereinafter
‘separations’).9 It also includes the newly hired workers, the so-called ‘accessions’. A worker is
classiﬁed in period t as newly hired if his tenure in that year is less than or equal to 12 months. In
this context, a newly hired worker may refer to an individual that moved between ﬁrms or to an
individual that comes from non-employment or the public sector.
7In agriculture a considerable amount of payments are non-pecuniary. We thought it better to exclude these
workers from the analysis. In any case, the number of these workers is almost negligible.
8It should be noted that when a worker is present in the QP registers in more than one ﬁrm in a given year, we
then retain the record for the ﬁrm in which the worker had the highest number of hours worked.
9Hence, separations are only identiﬁed between 1986 and 2004.
9Employees present in two consecutive years may also be classiﬁed as ‘stayers’ or ‘movers’. A
‘stayer’ is identiﬁed as a worker that was employed in the same ﬁrm for two consecutive years. A
‘mover’ is deﬁn e da saw o r k e rt h a tm o v e dt oad i ﬀerent ﬁrm from period t − 1 to period t.
The male population includes 14,242,814 year×individuals observations, corresponding to around
4 million individuals matched by identifying number and date of birth. According to Table 1,
male stayers are numerically the most important group, corresponding to 10,882,692 observations.
Furthermore, 1,203,119 observations refer to movers, 2,410,850 to new hires, and 3,445,218 to sep-
arations. The female population contains 9,398,893 year×individuals observations, corresponding
to around 2.9 million individuals. Female stayers correspond to 7,005,185 observations, movers to
672,821, accessions to 1,606,385 observations, and separations to 2,415,541. It should be noted
that, in a given year, an individual may be classiﬁed simultaneously as an accession and separation
or, for example, as a mover and a new hire. Thus, the sum of the observations in each of the four
groups does not correspond to the total number of observations.
Hereinafter, we will focus our attention on stayers, accessions and separations.






Tables A.1.1 and A.1.2 in Appendix A describe the data for male and female workers, respec-
tively.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
The empirical model that will be used to test for real wage cyclicality is a level wage equation with
controls for worker observed and unobserved heterogeneity, ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity, and
business cycle conditions. The option to deﬁne the wage equation in levels is justiﬁed by the need
to estimate the model for workers’ hires and separations since, by construction, panel data are not
available in these two cases. Thus, in order to account for worker/ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity,
the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator will be used instead of the standard ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimator. This
10avoids restricting the sample to solely continuously employed workers. The main problem with
this procedure is that workers or ﬁrms that appear only once over the entire period of analysis are
excluded.10
T h es t a t i cf o r mo ft h em o d e li s :
log wift = λi + γf + α0t + α1t2 + xiftβ + ξc yc le t + uift
where logwift is the natural logarithm of the real wage of individual i,i nﬁrm f at time t, cyclet
is a cyclical indicator such as the aggregate unemployment rate,11 t and t2 are a time trend and its
square and xift is a vector of time-varying worker characteristics. λi is an unobserved worker ﬁxed
eﬀect, γf a ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀect, and uift is a zero-mean random term with constant variance. Since
we are particularly interested in comparing the behavior of real wages over the cycle between stayers,
accessions, and separations, the model also includes dummy variables for hirings and separations
and an interaction term between those dummies and the cyclical indicator.
The coeﬃcient of interest is ξ. If the cyclical indicator corresponds to the unemployment rate,
the parameter ξ measures the percent wage change in response to a one-point increase in the
unemployment rate. A negative value of ξ implies that wages rise when unemployment falls, so that
wages are procyclical. If, on the contrary, ξ is positive, wages are countercyclical. As mentioned
before, the job ﬁnding and the job separation probabilities will also be used as measures of the
business cycle.12
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Real Wage Sensitivity to the Unemployment Rate
Table 2 reports the estimates of the coeﬃcient of the unemployment rate with respect to wages
(ξ) for male workers. Besides the aggregate unemployment rate, each regression includes age (and
10Thus, all ﬁrm-worker singletons were excluded from the data set, representing around 21% of the total number
of observations.
11Since wages are set at least six months to one year in advance, there is a delayed relationship between wages and
economic growth. To capture this lagged eﬀect we use the unemployment rate of the previous year.
12We thank Olivier Blanchard for this suggestion.
In Table A.2 of Appendix A the unemployment rate, the job ﬁnding probability, and the job separation probability
are reported for the 1985-2005 period.
11its square) as a proxy for labor market experience, a set of dummies for worker’s qualiﬁcation and
education levels and a quadratic time trend. The dependent variable is deﬁned as the natural log
of real hourly earnings. Hourly earnings correspond to the ratio of total regular payroll and total
number of normal hours. Total regular payroll includes base wages, seniority payments and regular
beneﬁts. The wages were deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and are expressed in 1985
Euros.13
The standard OLS estimates exhibit a strong procyclical behavior of real wages for all workers.
A 1-percentage point (p. p.) decrease in the national unemployment rate raises hourly earnings
of male stayers by 3.17 percent, by 3.59 percent for newly hired workers and by 3.5 percent for
recently separated workers.
Controlling for ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity leads to a reduction in the semi-elasticities esti-
mates of wages with respect to the unemployment rate, most notably for separations. The results
also reveal that real wages of newly hired workers are more responsive to cycle ﬂuctuations than
real wages of separating workers or workers in continuing jobs. A 1-p. p. decrease in the national
unemployment rate raises hourly earnings of newly hired workers by 3.53 percent and by only 2.94
percent and 2.72 percent, respectively, for stayers and separating workers.
Accounting only for worker unobserved heterogeneity yields to a further decrease in the semi-
elasticities of wages, deepening the diﬀerence across stayers/separations and accessions. The semi-
elasticities of wages with respect to the unemployment rate are -1.5 percent, -2.73 percent, and -1.45
percent for stayers, accessions, and separations, respectively. Comparing with previous empirical
studies that use micro panel data, we can say that the estimate for stayers lies slightly below the
bound of -1.93 obtained by Devereux and Hart (2006) for the U.K..14 15
Finally, the wage level equation was re-estimated including both a worker and a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect.
Estimation of a model with two high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects is a non-trivial problem. In Appendix
B we discuss our estimation strategy, which provides the exact OLS solution.
13Between 1986-93 the price index refers to March of year t−1 to March of year t, whereas from 1994 to 2005 the
price index corresponds to October of year t − 1 to October of year t.
14For a recent summary of these results see Pissarides (2007).
15Using the data set from Quadros de Pessoal for the 1986-2004 period, Martins (2007) obtained an estimate
for male workers employed in two consecutive years of -0.62. The diﬀerence behind these results may reside in the
estimation procedure employed by the author, who used a two-stage ﬁrst diﬀerences estimator.
12The unemployment rate coeﬃcient estimates from the two ﬁxed eﬀects model are presented at
the bottom of Table 2. These results corroborate our previous ﬁndings. First, once worker and
ﬁrm heterogeneity are accounted for, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found in the estimates of the
cyclicality of hourly earnings between stayers and separations. Second, entry wages are much more
procyclical than current wages. In particular, we found that a 1-p. p. increase in the unemployment
rate decreases hourly earnings by 1.41 percent for male stayers and by 2.77 percent for newly hired
workers.
Table 2: Real Wage Sensitivity to the Unemployment Rate - Men
Portugal, 1986-2005 (N=11,204,120)
Dependent variable: log of real hourly earnings
Stayers Accessions Separations
OLS estimator
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -3.17 -3.59 -3.50
Standard errors (0.014) (0.039) (0.030)
Within estimator, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -2.94 -3.53 -2.72
Standard errors (0.001) (0.035) (0.020)
Within estimator, worker ﬁxed eﬀects
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -1.50 -2.73 -1.45
Standard errors (0.001) (0.021) (0.016)
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -1.41 -2.77 -1.14
Standard errors (0.005) (0.002) (0.011)
4.2 Accounting for Aggregate Uncertainty
In our estimation we are using the whole population of paid workers in the private sector in the
Portuguese economy. In a cross-sectional sense, there is no sampling error to take into account.
Regardless of this largely philosophical discussion, the OLS standard errors are, of course, outra-
geously low. This procedure, however, does not properly accommodate the aggregate uncertainty,
13in a conventional time-series sense. After all, one observes only 18 diﬀerent values for the cycle
variables. We provide two ways to deal with this problem. The ﬁrst approach uses robust clus-
tered standard-errors, a common solution used to circumvent the presence of aggregate covariates
in microeconometric regression models. The second approach uses the results from an aggregated
regression.16 This latter approach is in the same spirit as the two-stage procedure used in this
literature, where, in the ﬁrst stage, the regression model includes the year dummies and, in the
second stage, the estimated coeﬃcients of the year dummies are regressed on the cycle variable.
Table 3: Real Wage Sensitivity to the Unemployment Rate - Men
Accounting for Aggregate Uncertainty
Portugal, 1986-2005
Dependent variable: log of real hourly earnings
Stayers Accessions Separations
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -1.41* -2.77* -1.14*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.403) (0.447) (0.404)
Simple regression on the aggregated variables (N=18)
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -1.39* -2.66* -1.03***
OLS standard errors (0.448) (0.401) (0.495)
Note: * signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 10%.
From Table 3 one can extract three important results. First, accounting for aggregate uncer-
tainty greatly inﬂates the standard errors, which increased by a factor of one hundred. Second, the
two practical solutions to correct the standard errors provide practically identical outcomes. And
three, the estimates of the semi-elasticities produced by the two procedures are very close.
16We thank Manuel Arellano for having suggested this solution.
The implementation details for both approaches are discussed in Appendix B.
144.3 The Cyclical Behavior of Worker and Firm Heterogeneity
Our estimation procedure produces estimates of the worker (ˆ λi)a n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (ˆ γf). Those
ﬁxed eﬀects capture observed and unobserved constant heterogeneity. Those eﬀects are, obviously,
constant. The presence or absence of workers and ﬁrms over the sampling period, however, may
exhibit a cyclical pattern. In Table 4 we look at the cyclical behavior (as measured by the unem-
ployment rate) of the worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.17
Worker persistent heterogeneity (say, observed and unobserved skills) is mildly countercyclical,
in particular, for separating workers. This evidence seems to suggest that during recessions ﬁrms
hire and ﬁre skilled workers in larger proportions. Firm heterogeneity (meaning say, higher paying
ﬁrms), however, is procyclical, most notably for newly hired and separating workers. This seems to
be in line with evidence that in booms high-paying ﬁrms create/destroy jobs in larger proportions
than low-paying ﬁrms. Overall, for the unemployment cycle variable, compositional bias plays a
signiﬁcant role.
Table 4: The Cyclical Behavior of Worker and Firm Heterogeneity - Men
Portugal, 1986-2005 (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate
Stayers Accessions Separations
Dependent variable: ˆ λi 0.104 0.487** 1.073*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.112) (0.205) (0.215)
Dependent variable: ˆ γf 0.156 -1.373* -1.082*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.124) (0.134) (0.161)
Note: * signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 10%.
17These estimates were obtained running an OLS regression of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates on the unemployment rate
a n daq u a d r a t i ct i m et r e n d .
154.4 Real Wage Sensitivity to Aggregate Labor Productivity
An alternative approach to analyze the cyclical behavior of wages, which is more closely rooted
in the Mortensen and Pissarides theoretical framework, is to estimate the elasticity of wages with
respect to aggregate labor productivity. In order to analyze the reaction of real wages to labor
productivity, we replace the unemployment rate with the measure of aggregate labor productivity
in the Portuguese private sector, as a cycle variable. The aggregate labor productivity measure is
deﬁned as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the private sector. Aggregate labor
productivity was deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator.18 Table 5 shows that wages for newly hired
workers, workers in ongoing job relationships, and workers leaving their jobs exhibit an elasticity
that is not at odds with the theoretical notion that it should be one, that is, a one-for-one wage
response to changes in labor productivity. Interestingly, Blanchard (2007) argues that one of the
main reasons for the Portuguese macroeconomic imbalances is rooted in the recent evolution of real
wages 20 percent above productivity.
18Table A.2 of Appendix A shows the evolution of aggregate labor productivity over the 1985-2005 period.
16Table 5: Real Wage Sensitivity to Aggregate Labor Productivity - Men
Portugal, 1986-2005
Dependent variable: log of real hourly earnings
Stayers Accessions Separations
OLS estimator
Cycle variable: Aggregate Labor Productivity 0.707 0.713 0.648
Within estimator, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Aggregate Labor Productivity 0.694 0.672 0.667
Within estimator, worker ﬁxed eﬀect (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Aggregate Labor Productivity 1.306 1.307 1.230
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Aggregate Labor Productivity 1.217* 1.264* 1.185*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.061) (0.060) (0.061)
Simple regression on aggregated variables (N=18)
Cycle variable: Aggregate Labor Productivity 1.212* 1.245* 1.169*
O L Ss t a n d a r de r r o r s (0.069) (0.050) (0.051)
Note: * signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 10%.
4.5 Bargained Wage, Wage Cushion and the Business Cycle
Here we examine the extent to which contractual wages, on the one hand, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage
arrangements, in the form of the wage cushion, on the other, are sensitive to the business cycle.
Cardoso and Portugal (2005) showed that in Portugal the wage cushion works as a mechanism to
overcome the constraints imposed by collective bargaining, granting ﬁrms a certain freedom when
setting wages. In this context, it will be interesting to analyze the extent to which contractual
wages and ﬁrm deviations from contractual wages vary over the business cycle.
The contractual wage was computed adopting the procedure suggested by Cardoso and Portugal
17(2005). Thus, the BARGW was deﬁned as the mode of the monthly base wage for each worker
category within each collective agreement. The wage cushion (WCUSH) was computed as the log
diﬀerence between the current actual wage and the current contractual wage for that professional
category. As exhibited in Table 6.A, the bargained wage is very sensitive to the evolution of
the unemployment rate, especially for new hires. The wage cushion, however, exhibits a cyclical
behavior only for new hires (see Table 6.B). It seems that during expansions ﬁrms are forced to pay
starting wages signiﬁcantly above those settled in sectoral wage agreements.
Table 6.A: Sensitivity of Bargained Wages to the Unemployment Rate - Men
Portugal, 1986-2005
Dependent variable: log of real bargained wage
Stayers Accessions Separations
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -1.93* -2.18* -1.67*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.323) (0.366) (0.328)
Simple regression on aggregated variables (N=18)
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate -1.91* -2.28* -1.76*
OLS standard errors (0.358) (0.330) (0.415)
Note: * signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 10%.
18Table 6.B: Sensitivity of the Wage Cushion to the Unemployment Rate - Men
Portugal, 1986-2005
Dependent variable: log of real bargained wage
Stayers Accessions Separations
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate 0.10 -0.67* 0.07
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.165) (0.195) (0.142)
Simple regression on aggregated variables (N=18)
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate 0.06 -0.58* 0.12
O L Ss t a n d a r de r r o r s (0.136) (0.224) (0.184)
Note: * signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 10%.
4.6 Robustness Checks
4.6.1 Alternative Wage Measures
In order to check if our results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of wages, the model was re-
estimated using alternative wage measures. Three other measures of wages were considered: the
monthly base wage, the hourly base wage and the hourly earnings including overtime pay. The
hourly base wage is deﬁned as the ratio between the monthly base wage and the total number of
normal hours worked in the month. The hourly earnings including overtime pay is deﬁned as the
ratio between total regular payroll including overtime pay and the sum of normal and extra hours
of work. As mentioned above, the wages were deﬂated using the CPI.
The two-way ﬁxed eﬀects results are presented in Table 7 for male and female workers. For
comparison reasons the unemployment coeﬃcient estimates for hourly earnings are reported in the
ﬁrst row.
Regardless the measure of wages used, the results exhibit a slightly less procyclical behavior of
women’s real wages compared to men’s real wages. This empirical evidence is in accordance with
previous ﬁndings by Tremblay (1990) and Solon et al. (1994).
The inclusion of overtime pay does not greatly change the estimate of the unemployment rate
19coeﬃcient for either men or women. This result is not surprising since in the Portuguese labor
market overtime hours represent a small percentage of total hours worked.19
Comparing the ﬁgures obtained for the estimates of the unemployment coeﬃcient using a
monthly measure instead of an hourly measure, leads us to conclude that monthly wages are more
procyclical than hourly wages, suggesting, as should be expected, that hours worked also exhibit a
procyclical pattern.
19In the 1986-2005 period, overtime work for ﬁrms employing paid labor corresponds, on average, to 0.9% of the
total number of hours worked.
20Table 7: Real Wage Sensitivity to the Unemployment Rate
Portugal, 1986-2005
Alternative Wage Measures
Cycle variable: Unemployment Rate
Stayers Accessions Separations
Men (N=11,204,120)
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
Dependent variable
Hourly Earnings -1.41* -2.77* -1.14*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.403) (0.447) (0.404)
Hourly Earnings inc OT -1.39* -2.66* -1.08*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.400) (0.389) (0.413)
Hourly Base Wage -1.54* -2.80* -1.30*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.397) (0.392) (0.388)
Monthly Base Wage -1.80* -2.91* -1.58*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.311) (0.330) (0.280)
Women (N=7,293,755)
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
Dependent variable
Hourly Earnings -1.11* -2.31* -0.75**
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.360) (0.342) (0.363)
Hourly Earnings inc OT -1.10* -2.30* -0.73**
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.364) (0.345) (0.368)
Hourly Base Wage -1.34* -2.57* -1.04*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.379) (0.350) (0.374)
Monthly Base Wage -1.57* -2.53* -1.22*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.285) (0.271) (0.282)
Note: * signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 10%.
214.6.2 Disentangling between Job Finding and Job Separation Probabilities
In this Section the impact of the business cycle on real wages is analyzed using a diﬀerent cyclical
indicator. In particular, the job ﬁnding and the job separation probabilities in period t − 1 were
included in the wage equation as alternative measures to the unemployment rate.20 The results
are shown in Table 8. The coeﬃcients of the new measures have the expected signs: a negative
eﬀect on hourly earnings for the job separation probability and a positive one for the job ﬁnding
probability. Thus, these ﬁgures are consistent with the unemployment rate estimates, though their
magnitudes cannot be directly compared.
Real wages react both to changes in the probability of ﬁnding a job and to changes in the job
separation probability. For example, a 1-p. p. increase in the job ﬁnding probability corresponds
to an increase of 0.7 percent in real wages for newly hired workers, whereas an increase of 1-p. p.
in the probability of job separation corresponds to a real wage decrease of 12 percent for newly
hired workers. Despite the dissimilitude of the coeﬃcient estimates, these two variables generate
real wage ﬂuctuations of identical amplitude.
Finally, these results indicate a less pronounced diﬀerence in the behavior of real hourly earnings
over the cycle across stayers and accessions.




et , where uS
t+1 is the number of short-term unemployed persons in quarter t +1(unemployed for fewer




ut , where ut refers to the stock of unemployed persons in quarter t.
22Table 8: Real Wage Sensitivity to Job Separation and Job Finding Probability - Men
Dependent variable: log of real hourly earnings
Stayers Accessions Separations
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Job Separation Probability -0.091* -0.117* -0.126*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.025) (0.028) (0.022)
Simple regression on aggregated variables (N=18)
Cycle variable: Job Separation Probability -0.091* -0.118* -0.127*
O L Ss t a n d a r de r r o r s (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
O L Ss o l u t i o nw i t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (N=11,204,120)
Cycle variable: Job Finding Probability 0.004* 0.007* 0.005*
Cluster-robust standard errors (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Simple regression on aggregated variables (N=18)
Cycle variable: Job Finding Probability 0.004* 0.006* 0.005*
OLS standard errors (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Note: * signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 10%.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this study is to provide further evidence on real wage cyclicality using a rich longitudinal
matched employer-employee data set for the 1986-2005 period, addressing the issue of heterogeneity
in wages responses to aggregate labor market conditions, across diﬀerent groups of workers: stayers,
accessions, and separations. For this purpose, we employ information on the registry of all Por-
tuguese wage earners in the private sector, comprising around 19 million worker-year observations.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact of the business cycle on real wages,
accounting simultaneously for worker and ﬁrm permanent unobserved heterogeneity. To do this,
we employ a new iterative procedure that provides the exact OLS solution to the two-way ﬁxed
23eﬀects model. To the best of our knowledge, earlier empirical research on wage cyclicality has never
considered the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity, restricting the attention solely on the compositional bias
generated by the presence of worker unobserved heterogeneity.
The empirical ﬁndings emerging from this exercise are sixfold. First, accounting for both worker
and ﬁrm heterogeneity, there is an indication of a moderate procyclical behavior of real wages for
stayers. The semi-elasticities of wages with respect to the unemployment rate are on the order of
-1.1 percent for females to -1.4 percent for males. That is, among workers in continuing jobs, an
increase of a percentage point in the unemployment rate leads to a real wage decline between 1.1
and 1.4 percent. Identical estimates were obtained for recently separated workers.
Second, wages of recently hired workers are much more procyclical than the wages of continuing
employed workers. A one-point increase in the unemployment rate decreases real wages of newly
hired workers by around 2.8 percent for men, and 2.3 percent for women. These results are robust
to changes in the deﬁnition of wages. They seem to vindicate Pissarides’ (2007) presumption that
one needs a semi-elasticity close to 3 to be able to explain the cyclical volatility of unemployment
and vacancies within the Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Third, and more directly related to the volatility puzzle debate, we found that wages for all
types of workers exhibit an elasticity that is not at odds with the theoretical notion that it should
be one, that is, a one-for-one wage response to changes in labor productivity.
Fourth, compositional bias plays a very important role. Failure to account for worker unobserved
(constant observed) heterogeneity may induce a countercyclical bias in wage cyclicality, whereas
failure to control for ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity may lead to a procylical bias, at least for new
hires and separations.
Fifth, when we employed alternative measures of the business cycle, that is, when we used the
job ﬁnding probability and the job separation probability instead of the unemployment rate, we
again found support for the cyclicality of real wages. In those speciﬁcations, however, the distinc-
t i o nb e t w e e nn e wh i r e sa n ds t a y e r si sl e s ss h a r p ,m ost notably, for the measure of job separation
probability.
And sixth, because ﬁrms often pay wages above the wage ﬂoors negotiated between the employer
associations and the trade unions, we decomposed the observed wage between the bargained wage
component — that agreed at the bargaining table — and the wage cushion component — that obtained
from the diﬀerence between the actual wage and the bargained wage. We found that, for all workers,
24the bargained wage is very sensitive to the evolution of the unemployment rate, whereas the wage
cushion exhibits a cyclical behavior only for newly hired workers.
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28APPENDIX A - Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1.1: Descriptive Statistics (1986-2005)
Men (N=11,204,120)
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Age (in years) 36.4 9.7 20.0 56.0
Education Level
Less than Basic School 0.025 0.0 1.0
Basic School 0.398 0.0 1.0
Preparatory 0.208 0.0 1.0
Lower Secondary 0.149 0.0 1.0
Upper Secondary 0.145 0.0 1.0
College 0.054 0.0 1.0
Non-deﬁned 0.020 0.0 1.0
Qualiﬁcation Level
Top Executives 0.046 0.0 1.0
Intermediary Executives 0.034 0.0 1.0
Supervisors 0.057 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled and Skilled Professionals 0.569 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled and Unskilled Professionals 0.221 0.0 1.0
Apprentices 0.041 0.0 1.0
Non-deﬁned 0.032 0.0 1.0
Monthly Base Wage (in real euros) 536.3 381.5 50.7 4061.0
Hourly Base Wage (in real euros) 3.2 2.38 0.4 23.2
Hourly Earnings (in real euros) 3.8 3.14 0.4 194.0
Hourly Earnings inc OT (in real euros) 3.8 3.16 0.4 194.0
29Table A.1.2: Descriptive Statistics (1986-2005)
Women (N=7,293,755)
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Age (in years) 34.4 9.1 20.0 56.0
Education Level
Less than Basic School 0.024 0.0 1.0
Basic School 0.332 0.0 1.0
Preparatory 0.205 0.0 1.0
Lower Secondary 0.154 0.0 1.0
Upper Secondary 0.191 0.0 1.0
College 0.074 0.0 1.0
Non-deﬁned 0.020 0.0 1.0
Qualiﬁcation Level
Top Executives 0.032 0.0 1.0
Intermediary Executives 0.027 0.0 1.0
Supervisors 0.024 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled and Skilled Professionals 0.472 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled and Unskilled Professionals 0.351 0.0 1.0
Apprentices 0.069 0.0 1.0
Non-deﬁned 0.025 0.0 1.0
Monthly Base Wage (in real euros) 456.2 324.4 50.4 4050.0
Hourly Base Wage (in real euros) 2.74 2.11 0.35 23.2
Hourly Earnings (in real euros) 3.11 2.61 0.35 118.6
Hourly Earnings inc OT (in real euros) 3.12 2.62 0.35 118.6
30Table A.2: Unemployment Rate, Job Finding Probability, Job Separation
Probability and Aggregate Labor Productivity
Portugal, 1985-2005
Unemployment Job Finding Job Separation Aggregate Labor
Rate (%) Probability (%) Probability (%) Productivity
1985 7.2 12.4 1.35 4.44
1986 7.4 17.4 1.41 4.61
1987 6.5 21.1 1.30 4.89
1988 5.7 20.3 1.16 5.02
1989 4.5 20.0 1.14 5.28
1990 5.1 25.7 1.24 5.40
1991 4.7 26.4 1.16 5.48
1992 3.9 21.1 1.26 5.51
1993 5.0 15.0 1.40 5.68
1994 6.0 17.5 1.59 5.78
1995 6.2 15.4 1.30 5.85
1996 6.3 15.1 1.23 5.92
1997 5.9 21.5 1.37 6.07
1998 5.0 26.2 1.26 6.18
1999 4.4 25.1 1.24 6.27
2000 3.9 24.4 1.11 6.32
2001 4.0 25.7 1.35 6.29
2002 5.0 19.5 1.71 6.35
2003 6.3 21.6 1.67 6.40
2004 6.8 15.8 1.56 6.54
2005 7.6 16.7 1.57 6.60
Source: Bank of Portugal and Franco and Torres (2008).
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Estimation of the worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects model In this appendix we detail our
estimation technique for the model that includes both ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed eﬀects. Because of the
high dimensionality of the problem, adding actual dummy variables to account for any of the ﬁxed
eﬀects is not a feasible approach. However, as it turns out, application of a partitioned algorithm
greatly simpliﬁes the estimation problem at hand and leads to the full least squares solution. The
idea consists of estimating the model by cycling between estimation on subsets of the parameters
[for a discussion of partitioned algorithms see, for example, Smyth (1996)]. To see how this applies
to our problem consider the simplest case of the typical least squares dummy variable model
Y = Xβ + Dα + ε ,( A . 1 )
where X is an M × k matrix of regressors, D is an M × n matrix containing n dummy variables
that account for group membership and β and α are the unknown parameters. If the least squares
solution for the α were known, we could obtain the least squares estimates of β by regressing Y
on X and an additional single variable containing the estimates of the αs. On the other hand, if
the least squares solution for β were known, we could easily obtain least squares estimates for the
α. The normal equations show that these are simply the group means of the elements of the vector
u = Y − Xb β. Hence, an estimation procedure for β and α could be implemented as follows:
1) Obtain initial values for β by regressing Y on X;
2) Compute u using the latest estimates of β;
3) Calculate estimates of α as the group means of the elements of u;
4) Estimate β by regressing Y on X and an additional variable containing the last estimates of
the α;
5) Return to step 2 until convergence.
Note that computationally all that is required is the estimation of several least squares regres-
sions with k+1explanatory variables and group means of elements of u.A si sw e l lk n o w nab e t t e r
approach to estimate β consists in running a regression in terms of deviations from group means
(the within-groups estimator). Consider now the case when a second ﬁxed eﬀect is added to (A.1),
Y = Xβ + Dα + Gγ + ε ,( A . 2 )
32where G is a matrix of dimension M × p containing p columns indicating membership to the
second group and γ is a vector of parameters. Now, the within-groups estimator is no longer
a viable alternative. However, the partition algorithm detailed above can be easily modiﬁed to
accommodate this more complex case. In this case one iterates between estimation of β, α and
γ.T o e s t i m a t e β in each iteration we regress Y on X and two additional variables, containing
the last available estimates of α and γ.I ne a c hs t e pw eo b t a i ne s t i m a t e sf o rα by computing the
group means of u1= Y−Xb β− b γ and the estimates for γ are computed in a similar way. Thus, the
full least squares equation may be estimated by iteratively running a linear regression with only
k+2regressors and computing group means. A well known disadvantage of partitioned algorithms
is their slow rate of convergence. To accelerate convergence of the model with two ﬁxed eﬀects
we adopt two strategies. First, we eliminate the need to estimate the second ﬁxed eﬀect in each
iteration by using the within-groups estimator. This amounts to replacing the linear regression
in step 4) of the algorithm by a regression with deviations from the means of the second group.
Second, in each iteration we retain the last two estimates of α and use the three data points to
adjust the trajectory of the estimates for the ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimation routines for the OLS
coeﬃcients, standard errors, and ﬁxed eﬀects are implemented in Stata and discussed in Guimarães
and Portugal (2009).
Estimation of the standard error associated with the cycle variable Estimation of the
standard error associated with the variable cyclet poses an additional problem because this variable
lacks cross-sectional variation. A common solution is to calculate a standard error that is robust to
(annual) clustering. However, implementation of the typical formula for clustered standard errors
is problematic because it requires the inversion of the high-dimensional matrix of regressors. To
circumvent this problem we compute the clustered standard errors in a ﬁnal regression that treats
the estimated ﬁxed eﬀe c t sa sa no ﬀset. We also implement an alternative approach suggested to us
by Manuel Arellano. The approach consists of the following ﬁve-step procedure:
1) Obtain the OLS solution with worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and retain the estimated ﬁxed
eﬀects;
2) Using the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects as an oﬀset, run a regression of the wage variable on all
regressors except the cycle variable. Keep the residuals from that regression;
3) Compute the yearly average of the residuals in 2) to obtain an aggregate series b ut;
334) Run a regression of the cyclet variable on all other regressors, again using the estimated ﬁxed
eﬀects as an oﬀset. Call those residuals d cyclet.
5 )R u nas i m p l eO L Sr e g r e s s i o no fb ut on d cyclet.
Both of these procedures provide a practical solution to estimate a credible standard error for
the coeﬃcient associated with the cyclet variable. However, a shortcoming of these procedures is
that neither takes into account the fact that the ﬁxed eﬀects had been previously estimated.
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